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We investigate the dynamic effects of five different fiscal shocks on the US economy using a structural 
vector autoregressive (SVAR) model that uses Blanchard-Quah type restrictions. We find that an increase 
in indirect taxes or in corporate taxes has a contractionary effect on the economy, while an increase in 
personal taxes is neither contractionary, nor expansionary.  These results imply that the Ricardian 
Equivalence hypothesis holds only for personal taxes. On the spending side, we find that an increase in 
government wages and salaries has a contractionary effect on the economy, while an increase in defense 
spending is expansionary. Our results suggest that different fiscal shocks have different and offsetting 
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1.  Introduction 
  This paper investigates the dynamic response of U.S. output, price level, and 
interest rate to fiscal policy innovations, using a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
model for the period 1959:2-2001:2. 
During the last two decades several experiments led to a revival of interest in 
fiscal policy.  First, the Reagan tax cuts in the U.S. generated a controversy about the 
supply-side effects of tax policy.  Second, fiscal consolidations in Europe and Canada 
which reduced budget deficits led to an increase in private consumption, which was 
contrary to the conventional wisdom.  Third, the formation of a monetary union in 
Europe, the Maastricht Treaty, the evolution to single common currency, and the 
establishment of the European Central Bank reduced the flexibility of monetary policy, 
made fiscal adjustments crucially important for the member countries and increased the 
role of fiscal policy. Fourth, the recent Bush tax cuts in the U.S. directed more attention 
towards the transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy. 
For a long period of time fiscal policy analysis was carried out within the 
Keynesian paradigm. Over the last two decades the Keynesian models have been 
challenged first at a theoretical level and more recently at an empirical level.  
At a theoretical level, conventional (Keynesian) views were challenged first by 
neoclassical and neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium models, then by the real 
business cycle models, and finally by the two-country intertemporal general equilibrium 
models. 
  1 In neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium models the effects of fiscal policy 
disturbances are closely related to the financing decisions of the government.  Using a 
one-sector neoclassical model with variable labor and endogenous capital accumulation, 
Baxter and King (1993) show that  a permanent increase in government purchases   
financed by lump sum taxes leads to an increase in employment and output and a 
decrease in real wages.  Output falls, however, when government purchases are financed 
by distortionary income taxes.  Dotsey (1994) demonstrates that when current 
government deficits are financed by future distortionary taxation, lower tax rates and 
higher deficits lead to reductions in investment and output.  Ludvigson (1996), on the 
other hand, indicates that if the labor supply is elastic, deficit financed cuts in 
distortionary income taxes may increase output.  In a similar way, Ohanian (1997), using 
an intertemporal general equilibrium model, shows that using a tax-financed fiscal policy 
during World War II instead of a debt-financed fiscal policy would have resulted in much 
lower output and welfare.  Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) use a RBC model and 
show that when aggregate demand shocks arising from stochastic movements in 
government consumption are incorporated into the analysis, the model generates a strong 
positive correlation between hours worked and average productivity. Braun (1994) uses a 
RBC model finds that the first-order effect of an increase in the corporate income tax rate 
is to lower the after-tax interest rate.  This produces an intertemporal substitution effect 
on the labor supply.  The labor supply shifts left, the after-tax real wage rate rises, and 
employment falls.  An increase in the personal income tax rate produces a much larger 
response because households reduce current consumption as well. Finn (1998) 
  2 investigates the question of government spending on cyclical economic activity within 
the context of a quantitative real business cycle model of the U.S. economy.  She reaches 
the conclusion that while shocks to government goods and purchases lead to an increase 
in private output, employment, and investment, shocks to government employment have 
the opposite effect.  In a recent work, Barry and Devereux (2003) present a dynamic 
general equilibrium model where fiscal spending reductions may be expansionary.  
The lack of consensus which exists among theoretical studies about the effects of 
fiscal policy is also found in empirical studies.  As mentioned in Baldacci et al. (2001), 
although the literature generally suggests small, positive spending multipliers and small, 
negative tax multipliers, there is some evidence for both negative spending multipliers 
and positive tax multipliers.   
Vector autoregressive (VAR) models have been extensively used in the literature 
to analyze the effects of monetary policy shocks. It is only recently, however, that 
attention has been directed towards estimating the effects of fiscal policy using VAR 
models. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) identify three dates of military buildup that are 
associated with the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan military 
spending buildup.  The exogenous shocks are measured by a dummy variable 
corresponding to these dates.  They find that both total and private GDP increase in 
response to military buildups.  Employing the same approach, Edelberg, Eichenbaum, 
and Fisher (1999) find that employment, output, and nonresidential investment rise, while 
real wages, residential investment and consumer expenditures fall in response to an 
exogenous increase in U.S. government purchases.   Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 
  3 (2004) identify fiscal policy shocks in a similar manner and find that exogenous changes 
in military purchases lead to a persistent increase in government purchases and tax rates 
on capital and labor income, a rise in aggregate hours worked, and a decline in real 
wages.  Yuan and Li (2000) and Fatas and Mihov (2001) examine the effects of 
government spending innovations for the U.S. economy by employing VAR models 
where identification is based on Choleski ordering.   Yuan and Li (2000) find that 
positive innovations in U.S. government spending increase U.S. output and the total 
hours worked.  Fatas and Mihov (2001) find that output responds positively and 
persistently to a government spending shock and the GDP deflator declines slightly but 
returns to its trend.  An increase in government spending is followed by an increase in 
consumption, investment, employment, real wages, and the real interest rate. Garcia-Mila 
(1989) identifies fiscal policy shocks by Choleski decomposition and finds a positive 
multiplier effect of state and local government purchases on output. Military purchases, 
on the other hand, are found to be only slightly expansionary in the very short term.  
Despite a number of studies incorporating government spending into VAR 
models, only a few studies have attempted to investigate the effects of tax policy 
innovations.  Blanchard and Perotti (2002) incorporate an aggregate tax revenue variable 
into the VAR framework by employing U.S. data.  They estimate the effects of 
exogenous shocks to real government purchases and real net taxes on economic activity 
within a structural VAR model by computing impulse response functions (IRFs). They 
use institutional information about tax and transfer systems and the timing of tax 
collections to identify the automatic stabilizing aspects of fiscal policy and use this in 
  4 deriving fiscal shocks. Their results consistently show that positive government spending 
shocks have a positive effect on output, while positive tax shocks have a negative effect.  
Perotti (2002) studies the effects of fiscal policy on GDP, prices and interest rates in five 
OECD countries using a structural VAR approach.  He argues that the effects of fiscal 
policy on GDP and its components have become substantially weaker in the last twenty 
years. He also contends that the tax multipliers tend to be negative but small, and that 
there is some evidence on positive tax multipliers while the net tax shocks have negative 
small effects on prices.  Finally, he indicates that the U.S. is an outlier in many 
dimensions, so the responses to fiscal shocks estimated on U.S. data are often not 
representative of the average OECD country.   
Economic theory suggests that different tax groups have different effects on the 
economy. For instance, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) develop a basic intertemporal 
model, which shows that income taxes and consumption taxes have different effects on 
household saving decisions. Neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium models developed 
by Baxter and King (1993), among others, indicate that lump sum taxes and distortionary 
taxes have different effects on the economy.  There is also empirical support for different 
effects by different tax groups. Using a panel of twenty two OECD countries, Kneller, 
Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) argue that distortionary taxation (income taxes and social 
security taxes) reduces growth whereas non-distortionary taxation (corporate taxes and 
indirect taxes) does not, and productive government expenditures (such as expenditures 
on infrastructure) enhance growth, while non-productive government expenditures (such 
as recreational expenditures) do not.   
  5 Baxter and King (1993) Ahmed and Yoo (1995), and Ohanian (1997) distinguish 
between government consumption expenditures on goods and services and government 
investment expenditures.  Finn (1998) Ardagna (2001), and McGrattan and Ohanian 
(2003) distinguish between government consumption expenditures with and without 
compensation of government employees.   
Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) show that cuts 
in government employment are expansionary, and stimulate business investment.   
Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, and Schiantarelli (2002) find that spending cuts, particularly in 
government wages and transfers, lead to expansions in output. 
In this paper, we investigate the response of output, price level, and interest rate to 
innovations in different revenue and spending instruments within a SVAR model which 
uses Blanchard and Quah (1989) type long-run restrictions.  
Our results indicate that different taxes and different categories of government 
expenditures have different effects on macroeconomic activity. When we estimate a 
SVAR with total taxes and total government expenditures for the U.S. economy, we find 
that fiscal policy is neither expansionary, nor contractionary. Nonetheless, when we 
decompose total taxes into three groups (personal taxes, corporate taxes, and indirect 
taxes) and estimate three different SVAR models, each with a different tax group, we find 
that an increase in indirect taxes or in corporate taxes has a contractionary effect on the 
economy, while personal taxes have neither expansionary, nor contractionary effects. 
Likewise, when we estimate a SVAR with government wages and salaries, an increase in 
government wages and salaries has a contractionary effect on the economy. On the other 
  6 hand, when we estimate a SVAR with defense spending, defense spending has an 
expansionary effect on the economy.  This evidence implies that choosing total taxes or 
total government expenditures as a measure of fiscal policy variable could be misleading 
and decomposing total taxes or total government expenditures into sub-categories would 
yield a more accurate picture.  
   The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the data 
and methodology used, Section 3 presents the empirical results, and Section 4 provides 
some concluding remarks. 
2.  Data and Methodology 
2.1. Data 
The data used in this paper are obtained from two different sources: the data for four 
different types of government revenues, namely personal, corporate, and indirect taxes, 
government consumption expenditures and gross investment, national defense expenditures, 
government wages and salaries, real and nominal GDP are obtained from the DRI database. The 
data for the CPI and the 3-month Treasury bill rate are obtained from the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Bank Fred II data base.  The different types of taxes, national defense expenditures, and 
government wages and salaries are deflated by the GDP deflator which is obtained after dividing 
nominal GDP by real GDP. The exact definitions of the variables and their source codes are 
presented in Table 1.  The data consist of quarterly observations for the 1959:1-2001:2 period. 
2.2. Methodology 
To investigate the response of macroeconomic variables to fiscal policy 
innovations, we use a SVAR model. Our structural VAR model imposes long-run 
identifying restrictions, pioneered by Blanchard (1989) and Blanchard and Quah (1989), 
  7 on an ordinary VAR model in order to infer structural shocks from it.  The long-run 
restrictions are based on neutrality restrictions. Prior to implementing this procedure, the 
model is transformed into first differences. Then, real variables are ordered before 
nominal variables, and output is ordered before the policy variables. The long-run effect 
of a shock on the level of a variable is simply the cumulative sum of the relevant moving 
average representation. As there is more agreement upon the long-run relationships 
between the economic variables, there is less controversy over the use of long-run 
restrictions relative to contemporaneous restrictions. 
  Assume an unrestricted VAR model written in moving average form: 
t t e L A X ) ( = ∆   ,          ( 1 )  
where X is a vector of macroeconomic variables, A(L) is a polynomial matrix of lag-
length l, L is the lag operator and e is a vector of reduced form shocks in the elements of 
X with variance-covariance matrix E(et et’) = Σ.   These reduced form shocks are likely to 
be correlated so they cannot be interpreted as pure structural shocks.  Imposing 
identifying restrictions, the SVAR model obtains:  
t t u L B X ) ( = ∆   ,          ( 2 )  
where B(L) is a polynomial matrix in L,  ut is a vector of serially and contemporaneously 
uncorrelated, normalized structural residuals with E(ut ut’) = I, and  ' ' BB A A = Σ . Here A 
and B are k x k matrices to be estimated and the expression on either side is symmetric 
This model only requires a minimum number of k.(k+1)/2 restrictions, and it enables us 
to make the same assumptions regarding each and every fiscal policy instrument.  In 
  8 addition, in many cases, economic theory provides more guidance about long-run 
relationships between economic variables rather than their short-run dynamics.  
  The vector X of macroeconomic variables comprises of the following variables. 
Output (Y, measured by real GDP), the price level (P, measured by the CPI), the 3-month 
Treasury-bill rate (R), tax revenue (T, measured by tax revenue of the i
th group measured 
in U.S dollars, deflated by the GDP deflator), and real government expenditures (G, in 
US dollars, deflated by the GDP deflator).  As mentioned above, each model was 
differenced before being included in the estimation.  In order to choose lag-lengths, the 
results of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) were used, and the lag length for all 
models was chosen as 5.  
To identify the structural shocks from the VAR model, ten identifying restrictions 
are required.  These are: Tax revenue innovations do not have a permanent effect on 
output (1); government expenditure shocks do not have a permanent effect on output (2), 
and on tax revenues (3); monetary shocks, as proxied by the interest rate, do not have a 
permanent effect on output (4), on tax revenues (5) and on government expenditures (6); 
and finally, price level shocks do not have a permanent effect on output (7), on tax 
revenues (8), on government expenditures (9) and on the interest rate (10). 
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  9 Impulse response functions (IRFs) are calculated from the SVAR estimation. This 
approach has recently been implemented by Aarle et al. (2003), without estimating the 
Monte-Carlo confidence bands.  In our paper, one-standard deviation confidence intervals 
are obtained from a Monte Carlo simulation based on 1000 draws.  
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1.  The Effects of Tax Innovations 
  The IRFs of all model variables to a one-standard deviation shock to total taxes 
and different tax groups are presented in Figures 1- 4.  Figure 1 presents the IRFs of Y, T, 
G, R, and P to a positive innovation in T.  The response of output is negative, indicating 
that an increase in taxes has a negative impact on output.  As indicated by the one-
standard deviation confidence band, however, the response of output is not significantly 
different from zero.  The response of T is positive and significant, implying that the 
innovation is permanent.  The response of G is positive, indicating that government 
expenditures rise in response to a permanent increase in tax revenues, but this is not 
significantly different from zero.  Interest rates fall, and again this is not significantly 
different from zero.  The response of the price level is negative.  This result is significant 
especially between the 3
rd and 5
th quarters. 
     Figure 2 presents the IRFs of Y,  P T,  G ,  R , and P to a positive innovation in 
personal taxes  P T .  The initial response of output is positive. It becomes negative after 
the 10
th quarter; however, in both cases the response of output is not significantly 
different from zero.  The response of  P T  is positive and significant, implying that the 
innovation to personal taxes is permanent.  The response of G is positive, but this is not 
  10significantly different from zero.  The response of the interest rate is not significantly 
different from zero.  The response of the price level is negative, and this is significant in 
the 3
rd quarter.  The initial response of output, even though it is not significantly different 
from zero, is somewhat puzzling.  One reason could be due the aggregated nature of the 
data.  Personal income taxes include taxes on all sorts of income, which may have 
different response patterns.  Since income tax data reported by individuals reflect the tax 
liability on the cumulative sum of personal income, we do not have the means to estimate 
the response of output to changes in the components of personal income taxes.   
  Figure 3 presents the IRFs of Y,  ,  G ,  R , and P to a positive innovation in 




th quarter.  The response of T  is positive and significant, implying that the 
innovation to indirect taxes is permanent.  The response of G is positive, but it is not 
significantly different from zero.  The interest rate and price level both fall in response to 
an increase in indirect taxes. 
I
  Figure 4 presents the IRFs of Y,  ,  G ,  R , and P to a positive innovation in 
indirect taxes T .  The response of output is negative and significantly different from 




th quarter.  The response of T  is positive and significant, implying that 
the innovation to corporate taxes is permanent.  The response of G is negative and 
significantly different from zero.  The response of G to T  innovations is very different 
from other innovations.  The IRFs indicate that government expenditures fall in response 
to an increase in corporate taxes.  This may happen if the government is using corporate 
C
  11taxes as a tool of last resort to reduce the deficit.  The interest rate and price level both 
fall in response to an increase in corporate taxes.   
  We can draw two important conclusions from the analysis of impulse response 
functions analyzed above.  First, different taxes may have different effects on the 
economy.  Aggregating these taxes and using the sum as a measure of fiscal policy may 
actually add more noise to the system and prevent us from seeing the different effects of  
these taxes on the economy.  The second conclusion that emerges from the above 
findings is related to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.  The Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis states that a switch from lump-sum tax finance to bond finance has no effect 
on the macro economy, holding everything else constant.  The IRFs above indicate that 
while the economy contracts in response to increases in indirect and corporate taxes, it is 
not affected by personal taxes. In this sense, the evidence from IRFs is inconclusive. On 
the other hand, indirect taxes are the least distortionary and they can be regarded as lump-
sum taxes.  In this sense, we get the best evidence from the IRFs of indirect tax 
innovations, which reveal that the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis does not hold.    
3.2. The Effects of Government Spending Innovations 
  The impulse response functions of all model variables to a one-standard deviation 
shock to government expenditures and to two components of government expenditures 
are presented in Figures 5-7.   Figure 5 presents the impulse response functions of Y, T, G, 
R, and P to a positive innovation in government expenditures G.  The response of output 
is negative, indicating that an increase in government expenditures has a negative impact 
on output.  As indicated by the one-standard deviation confidence band, however, the 
  12response of output is not significantly different from zero.  The response of T is negative 
and it is not significantly different from zero.   The response of G is positive and 
significant, indicating that the innovation to government expenditures is permanent.  The 
interest rate falls, and the negative response of the interest rate is significantly different 
from zero.  The response of the price level is negative, but it is not significantly different 
from zero. 
  We get a more interesting picture when we make a distinction between the wage 
component of government expenditures and defense expenditures.  Figure 6 presents the 
impulse response functions of Y, T, G,  R , and P to a positive innovation in government 
wages and salaries G .  The response of output is negative, and it is significantly 
different from zero until the 9
W
W
th quarter, indicating that an increase in government wages 
and salaries has a negative impact on output.  The response of T is positive and 
significant.  The response of   is positive and significant, indicating that the innovation 
to government wages and salaries is permanent.  The responses of both the interest rate 
and the price level are negative and significant.   
W G
Figure 7 presents the impulse response functions of Y, T,  D G,  R , and P to a 
positive innovation in defense spending  D G .  The response of output is positive and 
significantly different from zero for the first two quarters. The response of T is not 
significantly different from zero.  The response of  D G  is positive and significant, 
indicating that the innovation to defense spending is permanent.  The response of the 
interest rate is not significantly different from zero but the response of the price level is 
positive and significant. 
  13While it is difficult to reach a conclusion as to whether an increase in government 
expenditures have an expansionary or contractionary effect on the economy, by analyzing 
the effects of different components of government expenditures we can make more 
convincing arguments.  We find that while increases in wages and salaries have a 
contractionary effect on the economy, increases in defense spending have an 
expansionary effect.   
  3.3. Residual Analysis 
  Do estimated tax shocks make sense? As the history of tax policy is most well-
known for the U.S., we compared the estimated shocks with the dates of actual policy 
changes. Figures 8-9 display the residual analysis for the U.S.  
The top income tax rate in the U.S was reduced in the following years: 1964 
(from 91% to 77 %), 1965 (from 77% to 70%), 1970 (from 77 to 71.75%), 1981 (from 
70% to 69.13%), 1982 (from 69.13% to 50%). and 1987 (from 50% to 38.5%).  All of 
these policy changes are captured by our estimated shocks. In addition, we managed to 
capture the tax resurges of 1968 and 1975. When we look at the corporate tax shocks, our 
estimated shocks capture the corporate tax rate cuts of 1965 (top rate was decreased from 
50% to 48%), 1970 (from 52.8 % to 49.2 %), 1979 (from 48% to 46%), 1987 (from 46% 
to 40%) and finally 1988 (from 40% to 34%).  We also capture the increases in the 
corporate tax rate in 1968 (from 48% to 52%) and 1993 (from 34% to 35%).  The biggest 
estimated negative shocks (1975 and 1992), however, do not coincide with actual policy 
changes.  
 
  144.  Conclusion 
  This paper investigates the dynamic response of U.S. output, price level, and 
interest rate to fiscal policy innovations, using a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
model for the period 1959:2-2001:2 which uses Blanchard-Quah type restrictions.  We 
consider three types of tax innovations and two types of government spending 
innovations: on the revenue side innovations to personal, corporate, and indirect taxes 
and on the expenditure side innovations to government wages and defense spending.   We 
find that an increase in indirect taxes or corporate taxes has a contractionary effect on the 
economy, while an increase in personal taxes is neither contractionary, nor expansionary.  
These results imply that the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis holds only for personal 
taxes. On the spending side, we find that an increase in government wages and salaries 
has a contractionary effect on the economy, while an increase in defense spending is 
expansionary. Our results suggest that different fiscal shocks have different and offsetting 
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TABLE 1:  
Definition and Data Source for the Variables Used 
 
Variable  Definition  Data Source and Code 
Personal Taxes 
 
Federal, state, and local; income, 









Federal, state, and local; excise 
taxes, custom duties, sales taxes, 
property taxes, billions of dollars, 
SAAR 
DRI, TXIM 
    
 







Compensation of government 




expenditures and gross investment, 















expenditures and gross investment, 
billions of dollars, SAAR 
 
Gross Domestic Product, billions of 

















3-Month Treasury bill, secondary 
market rate  
 
Consumer price index for all urban 
consumers, all items, SA 
FRED II, TB3MS 
 
 




  19Figure 1: Shock to Total Taxes 
Shock to Total Taxes, 1959:2-2001:2, LL=5
Response of Y















































  20Figure 2: Shock to Personal Taxes 
Shock to Personal Taxes, 1959:2-2001:2, LL=5
Response of Y













































  21Figure 3: Shock to Indirect Taxes 
Shock to Indirect Taxes, 1959:2-2001:2, LL=5
Response of Y
























































  22Figure 4: Shock to Corporate Taxes 
 
 
Shock to Corporate Taxes, 1959:2-2001:2, LL=5
Response of Y


















































  23Figure 5: Shock to Government Expenditures 
Shock to Government Expenditures, 1959:2-2001:2, LL=5
Response of Y



















































  24Figure 6: Shock to Government Wages and Salaries 
Shock to Government Employment, 1959:2-2001:2, LL=5
Response of Y

























































  25Figure 7: Shock to Government Defense Spending 
Shock to Defense Spending, 1959:2-2001:2, LL=5
Response of Y
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